NOTE: Theses synopsis relate to the 1st generation of IMERS. The 3rd generation changes, including the rebate mechanism, are not reflected in the description below. These are provided for historical reasons.
The details of the scheme are provided below using two main criteria: Attractiveness and Practicability. Lessons learned have proved that successful schemes must combine policy appeal and economic efficiency with reliable data and feasible implementation. With some additional political will, the scheme can be operational even before 2012.
The mid-2007 IMERS synopsis, 1st generation (0.1 MB) used at the UNFCCC COP 13 in Bali meeting are included for comparison (note that the COP13 synopsis were based on the mid-2007 estimate of shipping emissions of around 0.5GtCO2; current estimates are double of that).
Scheme Design |
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-- (None1; using the UNFCCC SBSTA option 1 – no allocation) |
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-- (None needed) |
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Fuel payers for charges; ship managers and/or suppliers for reporting |
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Direct electronic; compliance enforced in selected ports, both for the provision of data (such as BDN) and payment of charges |
Implementation Feasibility |
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Emission growth: available |
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Fuel data, used or delivered: available (starting with Bunker Delivery Notes, BDN) |
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Voyage data for validation; CO2 index from real data once the scheme operates, used as a performance measure for ships, routes etc. |
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IMO for governance; World Bank, or similar, to manage adaptation funding (recommended Adaptation Fund under the UNFCCC) |
Scheme Parameters |
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Yes; enclosed calculations done for notional reductions of 20% in 2020, and 50% in 2050 from 2005 level |
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Baseline not needed, and avoided as it is currently commercially inadequate. |
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Bubbles for containers, bulk, tankers, etc., could further improve the scheme equity and speed up implementation |
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2 years – could be operational BEFORE 2012 |
Scope and Goals |
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Worldwide |
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All vessels > 400 GT |
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Global, or per vessel bubbles (containers, bulk, tankers, …) |
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Adaptation to climate change in developing countries |
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International, CO2 only at the beginning |
Political Appeal |
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Through financing policy for adaptation; differentiation at point of distribution rather than collection |
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None in sector; negligible outside shipping |
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A hassle-free long-term solution, increased cash flow, compliance easily verifiable, long term investment clarity, better image of shipping |
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Could be under MARPOL; IOPCF - a precedent for a direct fund; aviation route charges as an example of delegating collection and billing responsibility to a central organisation (Eurocontrol in Europe) |
Costs |
(for 2010, key assumed prices: fuel $500/tHFO, carbon $30/tCO2) |
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Low: 0.1%, equivalent to adding $1 to price of $1,000 of imported goods |
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Negligible (20 minutes reporting time for ship managers per month) |
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$10/tCO2 or $30/tFuel (linked to emissions and carbon price) |
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Under 5% (a centralized solution; operational ratio higher in the initial years) |
Effectiveness |
(assuming 1GtCO2 baseline in 2005; for others – multiply results by the respective baseline value in GtCO2 |
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$4bn/pa; Total mitigation of 26 GtCO2 by 2050 (30% of it is emission avoidance) |
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+0.5% annually, $2bn/pa Technology Fund, for transformational R&D and technology transfer |
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$4bn/pa, for developing countries (likely as contribution to the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund) |
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Only parties that legally support the scheme are eligible to participate in the scheme benefits (adaptation, technology and so on) |
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Cost-effective through usage of carbon markets, and a dedicated maritime emission registry |
Flexibility |
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CDM, CERs without limits; also programmatic CDM for increased quality |
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Applies to both existing and new ships; no problems with including new entrants as scheme is based solely on charges, rather than allowances |
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Charge annually; funding policy reviewed and adjusted periodically by IMO |
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Can be limited to ship type or size threshold; easy scaling up thanks to the harmonized charge that does not vary with the number of participants |
1 The scheme avoids the complex problem of allocating emission allowances to countries, flags, routes or ships, and associated issues, such as lack of a reliable emission baseline, high transaction costs for small emitters etc. It achieves an emission cap on shipping emissions through a hybrid price-quantity mechanism that is linked to established emission markets, thereby delivering the reduction in the most cost effective manner.